



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

219  
29 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


Subj: Comments on Departmental Headquarters and National Military  
Command Structure Studies - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Departmental Headquarters Study and the National Military Command Structure Study have been reviewed and my comments on the Ignatius Study are attached. I have attached comments prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Steadman Study since it relates overwhelmingly to their roles as members of the Joint Chiefs, outside the framework of the Military Departments.

Both studies generally confirm that the Department of Defense is well organized and properly structured to carry out its missions. The study project directors have conducted thoughtful analyses of complex issues and have produced reports that respond appropriately to both Presidential direction and Office of Management and Budget reorganization tasking.

The majority of the recommendations contained in both studies have been favorably received within the Department of the Navy.

Mr. Ignatius and Mr. Steadman should be commended for their highly productive efforts, and I believe that portions of both studies would be useful to Dr. Rice in the completion of his longer term study of resource management.

  
R. James Woolsey  
Acting Secretary of the Navy

Attachments

Copy to:  
Mr. Ignatius  
Mr. Steadman  
Dr. Rice

28 August 1978

COMMENTS ON THE IGNATIUS STUDY

- Manpower numbers: Adjustments were made to OPNAV and Secretariat manpower figures without footnote or explanation. As a result, the table in Exhibit III is in error and misleading. The column containing 1978 strength figures should be footnoted as follows:

2/ The FY 1978 end strength for the Navy Secretariat has been adjusted to transfer certain support personnel from "Secretariat" to "Staff" in order to provide a more meaningful comparison with the other services.

- Comments on recommendations:

1. Use the Armed Forces Policy Council, as it was chartered, to offer the Secretary of Defense frequent advice in the formulation of Defense policy.

Comment: Concur. A smaller meeting might usefully be held for discussion after each AFPC meeting, consisting of the Secretary, Deputy, and Under Secretaries of Defense, the JCS, and the Service Secretaries.

If recommendation no. 1 is implemented, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a Service Chief, should be included as a charter member. This would require legislative correction to Article 171 of the Security Act.

2. Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with assignments including politico-military long-range planning and contingency planning.
3. Assign the Under Secretary for Policy, working in close coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to support the Secretary of Defense in the development of Defense Policy Guidance governing the Consolidated Guidance for force structure and resource allocation decision.

Comment: Concur. Such steps should improve informal communication between OSD, the Military Departments and the JCS and help tie together international political considerations, resource allocation, and military planning. Such an office might be able to provide a more sharply defined statement of national security interests and policies. Military planners could then develop operations and contingency plans to meet the objectives of current U.S. national policy as interpreted by the planning office.

Given the close association between national security policy, security objectives, and contingency planning, the Navy Department supports the recommendation that the director be an active duty military officer. A rough balance in this office between civilian and military personnel would provide an appropriate mixture of skills and backgrounds.

The Navy Department also agrees with the recommendation that this office would be the best equipped and prepared to be the principal staff element supporting the Secretary of Defense in the development of the Consolidated Guidance (CG). Such an office could more definitively outline the national security interests and objectives which U.S. military forces should be designed to support.

4. Make further improvements in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process to establish more clearly the primary and secondary mission requirements of major weapons systems.

Comment: It is of key importance that the DSARC process remain the primary tool for weapon system development decisions. This recommendation should encourage early analysis of competing systems. The Resource Management Study should further evaluate this recommendation as a part of its examination of the acquisition process.

5. Eliminate redundant and repetitive program reviews during the budget development process.

Comment: Concur. This is the most important of the project's recommendations. Viewed from the perspective of a Military Department there are at least four separate staffs in OSD, in addition to the OMB staff, that participate in the two major annual reviews -- the program review in the summer and the budget review in the fall. Detailed review of programs by at least four Congressional Committee staffs follow the Executive Branch reviews. These reviews require a great deal of time and attention from senior officials.

Within the Executive Branch, the data required in the program review have become sufficiently detailed over the years that the summer cycle amounts to a review of a 5-year program budget. This year, for instance, 59 changes were made in the Department of the Navy POM by the APDM decisions. Of these the Navy Department lodged a reclama on 25 and could effectively raise 7 as major issues.

The fall budget review then covers much of the same ground for the budget year alone. If these two cycles could be united, say in the late summer and early fall after there were firmer figures for the overall Federal budget, the savings in time would be very great for all staffs and managers concerned.

Such a single review might usefully be preceded by a review of a few major issues in the spring or early summer, issues of a sufficient magnitude that they raise questions relating to the link between policy and strategy objectives on the one hand, and major savings in resource allocation on the other.

If the current system is maintained, effective methods are needed to reduce the pressure on top managers by having their senior assistants work out mutually agreeable solutions, or at least highlight major policy disagreements. For example, serious consideration should be given to holding systematic preparatory meetings before the Secretary's APDM and Budget Review sessions; these preparatory sessions should be between the relevant Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of OSD and the Military Departments, with appropriate uniformed military participation. Such preparations could significantly increase the number of potential "out of court settlements," subject of course to the Secretary's final call. In this way disagreements about such issues as the proper program base from which to calculate manpower requirements, costing assumptions for RIFs, the impact of A-76 contracting out policies, the precise nature of requirements for flyoffs between competing aircraft, the degree of program restructuring necessary to keep production lines open, and other such matters could probably be resolved, and could certainly be clarified, without drawing so heavily on the time of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, Service Secretaries, and Service Chiefs.

Again, the Resource Management Study should evaluate this recommendation and the relationship between the acquisition process and the FYBS.

6. Re-examine the decision to link manpower, reserve forces, and installations and logistics responsibilities under a single Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Comment: Implementation of this recommendation would fall wholly under the purview of the Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Navy can work with either organizational structure selected for these functions in OSD.

7. Establish flexibility in the procedures governing rotation of Civil Service executive-level personnel within and outside the Department of Defense.

Comment: Concur.

8. Make multi-service assignments to Service Secretaries from time to time, instead of to Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Comment: Concur.

9. Establish a formal role for the Service Under Secretaries oriented to common liaison functions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Comment: Concur. As described in the comment to recommendation no. 5, Service Under Secretary meetings with the appropriate Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense would provide valuable prior screening for program and budget meetings involving the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretary and the Service Chief.

10. Authorize the Service Secretaries, if they desire, to eliminate their Assistant Secretaries for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics functions, with the Service Secretaries carrying out their responsibilities through the military heads of the respective functions and with the assistance of the civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Comment: The Navy Department does not desire to implement this recommendation and thus, as written, it is not applicable to the Navy. In light of recommendation 6, it is not clear how the ASD(M,RA&L) would accommodate those additional functions allocated to the OSD staff. Further, the scope and frequently controversial nature of the responsibilities involved makes it improbable that the single OSD staff could serve its two masters satisfactorily. The current organizational structure within the Navy Secretariat is functioning well, permits the right degree of delegation, and provides an adequate measure of supervisory control.

11. Integrate, in each Military Department, the Research and Engineering staffs now separately reporting to the Assistant Service Secretary and the Service Chief, and concurrently, increase the number of development and acquisition programs assigned for primary management authority to the Military Departments.

Comment: The Navy Department does not concur with the recommendation to integrate the Research and Engineering staffs. A full integration of all staffs dealing with research, engineering and acquisition would require, in the Navy Department, reallocation of responsibilities between two Assistant Secretaries, since ship acquisition is the responsibility of ASN(M,RA&L). Further, such a total shift could disrupt the lines of authority and accountability between the Service Chief and the Service Secretary, clouding the responsibility for development of military requirements, which is the clear responsibility of the Service Chief.

As an initial step to examine some of the objectives of this recommendation, the Navy Department is now examining the possibilities for combining the technology base programs, to a greater degree than is now the case, under common management. A short study has been commissioned

to address this question under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Navy. The working group includes distinguished scientists and managers from industry, members of the Naval Research Advisory Committee, as well as Navy officers and civilians. The study will address the merits, disadvantages, feasibility, and implications of more unified Navy management of the technology base. Findings will be reported this October.

The Navy Department concurs in the recommendation to increase the number of development and acquisition programs assigned for primary management authority to the Military Departments.

12. Provide common access for both the Service Secretary and the Service Chief to the Military Departments' Systems Analysis, Inspector General and Audit Service capabilities.

Comment: The Navy Department concurs with the intent of this recommendation. It can be accomplished within existing procedures.

13. Continue the effort to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the material area.

Comment: The Navy Department does not concur with this recommendation. The relevant Navy Department staffs have already been reduced to a level of concern, and the trend toward further reductions should be halted. To delegate headquarters responsibilities further would attenuate the voice of the operational commands within the headquarters, and dilute the functions of policy making, planning and requirements determination with those of managing material acquisition. The recommendation fails to recognize the growing demands placed on the headquarters staff by enlarged staffs and increased information requirements outside the Navy Department. Efforts at detailed management of Service projects by staffs outside the Navy Department demand responsible and responsive counterparts at the headquarters staff on an equal footing. In addition, no rationale is given as to why either management effectiveness or cost effectiveness would be enhanced by further delegation to the second echelon. Indeed, such delegation can tend to obscure the visibility of assets, thus decreasing management effectiveness.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO  
Ser 00/500449  
29 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: National Military Command Structure (Steadman Study);  
comments on

Encl: (1) CNO Comments on the Steadman Study

1. In response to your request, I am forwarding my comments on the subject study for your consideration.

2. By way of summary, Mr. STEADMAN focused on the following question: Can the National Military Command Structure, as presently organized, work well enough to cope with the national security problems of the future? His study concludes that there is room for improvement, and specifies several changes which would:

- a. enhance the role of the Chairman, JCS.
- b. place the Chairman, JCS and the CINCs in the formal resource allocation process.
- c. enhance the independence of the Joint Staff by changing the process through which joint military advice is provided to the SECDEF.
- d. assign a significant role in the review of military operational plans to the newly created Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

3. I concur with the majority of the study recommendations. By way of exception, I am concerned with the recommendations which act to isolate the Chairman, JCS from the Joint Chiefs. Balanced military advice is developed through the close relationship of the CJCS to the Service Chiefs, and any degradation of that cooperation is bound to affect the Joint Staff product.

4. I am generally satisfied with the current role which the Chairman and the CINCs play in resource allocation. However, I concur that this role can be enhanced through better application by the Joint Staff. Growth in the Staff is not necessary to do macroanalysis of major programs. I fully support the Chairman's desire to represent the Joint Chiefs on broad issues of major importance and intend to provide him with increased support in this regard.

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5. Increased independence of the Joint Staff is also an area of concern. Present Joint Staff procedures permit full discussion by all participants with exception to the majority view if warranted, and provision of high level guidance at the outset of staff processing. All the tools to implement the Steadman recommendations exist; they need only to be properly used to improve the quality and timeliness of military advice.

6. Finally, there is considerable merit in establishing the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) as the central policy office within OSD. This step should contribute to improved quality of policy guidance to military planners, resulting in military plans which are designed to achieve national security objectives. Nonetheless, a distinction must be preserved between providing policy guidance and preparing military plans. These two functions are clearly separated now and must remain so.

7. Detailed comments on the subject study are attached at enclosure (1). The issues are presented in the order in which they appear in the study and are grouped under the major study subdivisions. For ease of reference, the page number where the issue is found in the study is included with each issue statement. While the majority of the report impacts on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you may wish to address your comments to those issues indicated by an asterisk.



T. B. HAYWARD  
Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations



CNO COMMENTS  
ON NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE  
(STEADMAN STUDY)

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

Issue 1: JCS/SECDEF should review the UCP at least every two years. (p. 8)

Comment: The UCP reflects the realities of the moment. Conditions change over time, requiring a periodic review of command arrangements. As an example, a complete review was conducted in 1975, and specific issue revisions to the UCP were conducted in 1976 and 1977. A JCS action on a major geographical assignment is in progress.

It is clear that the UCP is an active document which receives frequent attention as circumstances require. In addition, the plan is administratively reviewed annually by the Joint Staff. In view of the regular annual and special one-time reviews which address the UCP, a requirement to conduct a routine periodic review is both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Issue 2: CINCs of unified commands should be selected "on the basis of best qualified officer with consideration given to mission and forces assigned rather than strictly to service affiliations." (p. 8)

Comment: There are several problems with departure from the Service affiliation of the CINCs. Random assignment of CINCs could adversely impact on statutory grade limits by Service. Rotation of billets between the Services would preclude any meaningful grooming of a suitable relief. For NATO, SACLANC is required to be a U.S. Naval Officer; periodic changes would be awkward.

On the positive side, the current Service affiliation of the CINCs reflects the consideration that mission and forces assigned be accounted for. In fact, the assigned mission of each CINC appears to be a principal factor in the current selection of a commander.

The CINCs are currently selected according to missions and forces assigned, and the CNO supports a continued effort to do so.

The recommendation suggests that the current CINCs are not particularly well chosen, a suggestion that the record does not support. No change in the present procedures is evidently necessary.

Enclosure (1)

Issue 3: CINC's "military diplomacy" role should be an important consideration when considering UCP organization and functions. (p. 8)

Comment: Concur. A security assistance overview strengthens the OSD position with the State Department on command arrangements overseas.

Issue 4: No need for unified commands to cover all areas of the world. (p. 8)

Comment: Concur.

Issue 5: Special study should examine component commands with a view toward identifying redundancies in functions and personnel. The feasibility of consolidating the components' logistic functions should be closely examined. (p. 8)

Comment: Mr. STEADMAN indicated only that this issue was not studied and that possible redundancies exist. Logistics functions are unique to component commanders and any reduction in component commands are likely to be offset by expanding the CINC staff. Further, consolidation of logistics functions would be most difficult in view of the complex wartime requirements of the components. There is concern that a consolidated system would lack the required responsiveness. There is no evidence in the Study that such a review would be fruitful, and therefore a massive review effort is unwarranted.

A preferred alternative proposal would be to encourage each CINC to study his own components before a special study is commissioned to examine the entire issue.

#### EUCOM

Issue 1: MIDEAST should remain with EUCOM. (p. 12)

Comment: This recommendation concludes that the present command arrangement is satisfactory.

Issue 2: EUCOM should continue to plan for, and execute when directed, all contingency operations in MIDEAST. (p. 12)

Comment: This is the current practice.

Issue 3: There should be sufficient flexibility in MIDEAST planning to permit running of contingency Ops from Washington with EUCom in supporting role and/or permit establishment of on-scene unified command reporting either to EUCom or Washington. (p. 12)

Comment: There is sufficient flexibility in current plans to permit the kinds of command arrangements suggested in this issue. When a crisis arises, there should be an established command arrangement which is known to all involved, and crisis does not seem to be the appropriate time to change. A clear, widely understood chain of command is the best preparation for a crisis requirement for rapid response in the field. Mr. Steadman recognized (p. 13) that, "those crises that were built around a CINCs plan seemed to run more smoothly than those that were predominately conducted ad hoc."

The military commander on the scene is best prepared to take appropriate action. EUCom is prepared to take charge and should be permitted to do so. An alternate plan would be to establish an on-scene unified command which would report through the CINC.

While present arrangements permit flexibility in command and control, the preferred system relies on the CINC to take charge in a crisis and report via a prearranged chain of command.

Issue 4: JCS should examine the concept of a sub-unified command for MIDEAST reporting to EUCom — provide JCS advice on proposal to SECDEF. (p. 13)

Comment: This issue is tied closely to the previous issue on the MIDEAST. For the reasons already given, EUCom has managed its area effectively and should continue to do so. Establishment of a sub-unified command would require a personnel increase and would require negotiations to obtain a headquarters location. However, while the present command arrangement is satisfactory, a JCS examination of the need for a sub-unified command may be useful.

Issue 5: Africa south of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUCom. (p. 13)

Comment: A JCS review is now in progress on this issue. Preliminary indications are that the JCS will favor the current arrangement, leaving Africa south of the Sahara unassigned to any CINC.

#### LANTCOM

Issue 1: LANTCOM should retain presently assigned areas and responsibilities. (p. 14)

Comment: Concur.

Issue 2: JCS should review command arrangements for U.S. maritime assets in the Atlantic and Med and determine whether they achieve optimum effectiveness for U.S. and NATO Defense postures. (p. 14)

Comment: A review of the command arrangements would be most welcome. JSCP provides certain in-place naval forces (the U.S. SIXTHFLT) for USCINCEUR and the U.S. reply to the annual NATO Defense Planning Review Questionnaire (DPQ) formally assigns those forces to SACEUR. In the Allied command Europe Order of Battle (ACE ORBAT), these forces are further specified as being committed to CINCSOUTH, whose area of responsibility is the Mediterranean.

Peacetime employment of these forces is severely constrained by the DPQ requirement to maintain the forces in the vicinity of the Mediterranean. While exceptions have been granted by SACEUR, on a case by case basis, for employment of these forces in the North Atlantic or Northern European waters, the present inflexible command arrangements and the artificial boundaries dividing NATO's maritime areas pose a continuing obstacle to flexible employment. The naval forces deployed in support of NATO should be able to respond to the threat regardless of whether it occurs on the Southern or Northern Flank or in the Atlantic.

#### PACOM

Issue 1: PACOM should retain present areas of responsibility. (p. 17)

Comment: Concur.

Issue 2: Maximum flexibility should be retained in command arrangements for Korea to permit present command organization, direct command by Washington, or a combination of the two to handle crisis/war. If organizational decisions cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, then the decision should assume a unified command reporting directly to Washington. (p. 17)

Comment: There is sufficient flexibility in current plans to permit the kinds of command arrangements suggested in this issue.

When a crisis arises, there should be an established command arrangement which is known to all involved. Crisis does not seem to be the appropriate time to change. A clear, widely understood chain of command is the best preparation for a crisis requirement for rapid response from the field. Mr. STEADMAN recognized that (p. 31) "those crises that were built around a CINC's plan seemed to run more smoothly than those that were predominantly conducted ad hoc".

The military commander on the scene is best prepared to take appropriate action. The commander, U.S. Forces Korea, is prepared to take charge and should be permitted to do so, reporting through the assigned commander, CINCPAC.

Issue 3: Army component command should not be reinstated unless convincing argument is presented that it would be demonstrably more effective than current arrangement. (p. 17)

Comment: The U.S. Army is currently reviewing this issue. In view of the awkward status of the present Army representative, U.S. Navy should support reinstatement of the Army component command in the Pacific command.

#### REDCON

Issue 1: \* Designate as a focal point for coordination of day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.

-- JCS/JTB continue adjudication of major airlift/sealift allocation. (p. 20)

Comment: This proposal is currently under review by the Joint Staff. In addition, the JCS exercise NIFTY NUGGET, scheduled for Fall 1978, focuses on mobilization/deployment matters.

Issue 2: Greater Naval and Marine forces participation in joint training exercises. (p. 20)

Comment: At present, USN/USMC forces are only assigned to LANTCOM, PACOM, EUCOM. The requirement to train and operate with those commands must necessarily take precedence. Realistic force structure rules out any significant change in current practice.

Nonetheless, there may be an opportunity to train in the U.S. Navy's mission in sealift in support of forces overseas. This sealift could be profitably exercised in scenarios like the REFORGER series in Germany. However, greater participation, in addition to present commitments, will mean increased operating costs. Any increase in joint participation should be within current funding constraints and only in exercises of mutual benefit.

Issue 3: Broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces. (p. 21)

Comment: There are very specific assignments of doctrine responsibility to each of the Services. DOD Directive 5100.1 and JCS Pub 2 are the authoritative sources of these responsibilities, including a statement that SECDEF may assign doctrinal matters on joint operations which are not otherwise assigned. Since REDCOM is a supporting command, it currently makes an important contribution in joint operations by identifying shortcomings and deficiencies noted during exercises. An increased doctrinal role for those operations in which REDCOM routinely participates, and for which no Service has current responsibility, can be supported.

Issue 4: Increased U.S. Navy and Marine participation on REDCOM staff to achieve the foregoing objectives. (p. 21)

Comment: There is no obvious need to increase participation on the REDCOM staff due to the current limited USN/USMC interface with REDCOM. However, should REDCOM be given a larger doctrinal role (see the previous issue), increased participation would become necessary.

#### SOUTHCOM

Issue 1: Retain as is for period of negotiations and transfer of responsibilities and facilities resulting from Panama Canal Treaties. (p. 22)

Comment: Concur.

Issue 2: On completion of Panama Canal transfer, review in light of then prevailing political-military environment. (p. 22)

Comment: Concur, although the review should not focus simply on the Canal responsibilities of USCINCSO. Political-military representation, security assistance requirements and contingency planning responsibilities exist not only in the Canal but in all of Latin America and should be considered during the review.

#### SAC

No Recommendations

#### MAC

No Recommendations

#### ADCOM

Issue 1: Recently completed Air Force study is under review by appropriate authorities and, therefore, was not discussed. (p. 24)

## WARTIME/CRISIS MANAGEMENT

### Issue 1: Chain of command should be used.

- if an element is by-passed, it should be fully informed of developments.
- should be no confusion of proper flow of communications and focus of responsibility. (p. 32)

Comment: Concur.

### Issue 2: NCA decisions, during crisis, should be written and verified whenever possible.

- oral decisions should be followed up immediately in writing.
- feedback mechanism should be established. (p. 32)

Comment: Concur.

### Issue 3: A variety of NMCC-Centered CPX's responding to realistic hypothetical crises should be conducted to test NMCS.

- senior level policymaking personnel should be encouraged to participate. (p. 32)

Comment: Concur.

## MANAGEMENT OF UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMANDS

### Issue 1: Role of CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of forces under his command. (p. 38)

Comment: The essential role of the CINC is to be prepared to fight with the forces on hand. A larger role, to include participation in force requirements, could divert the CINC's attention from this task. In addition, a programming role will very likely require a personnel increase. The CINCs now have an input to the SECDEF through their quarterly readiness reports, with the prioritized list of USCINCEUR representing a most useful submission. Further, the CINC can influence force requirements through submission of the R&D letter, input to the JSPDSA,



comments on PDMs and the CG, and by working with components in early stages of program inputs to the Services.

The present system of quarterly reports appears adequate. As an alternative, the component commanders could submit requirements through the CINCs as well as the Secretarial chain.

Issue 2: SECDEF designate CJCS as his agent for supervising CINCs.

- amend directives to indicate SECDEF will transmit orders to CINCs through CJCS who will act in consultation with JCS when time permits.
- JCS remain as immediate military staff to SECDEF. (p. 38)

Comment: DOD Directive 5100.1 specifies that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The Chairman is now empowered to act on behalf of the JCS when time constrains full consultation. If the directives are rewritten to preserve the JCS as the military staff, and to require full consultation when time permits, it would strengthen the role of the JCS. Any attempt to strengthen and isolate the Chairman from the JCS corporate body should be carefully weighed. It is impossible to make a final judgment on this issue until specific proposals are formulated.

Issue 3: \* Services/JCS/OSD conduct an indepth review of readiness capabilities reporting to develop a system to provide SECDEF detailed, thorough and well articulated info on readiness and force capabilities, including limitations, and recommendations for deficiency correction. (p. 39)

Comment: The entire process of readiness reporting is under review by the DOD Readiness Management Steering Group.

- Issue 4: CJCS, supported by CINCs, be given formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions. (p. 39)

Comment: Active participation in the resource allocation process requires a large staff commitment (in time and energy) to be properly prepared for analytical and budgetary comment. Such an effort is likely to require an undesirable increase in staff personnel.

The Chairman could perform a very useful role in supporting CINC resource allocation issues of a broad capabilities nature, remaining free of detailed systems analysis issues. This type of involvement of the Chairman can be accomplished within the existing resources of the Joint Staff. Any more detailed involvement, of a nature which would require an increase in the personnel of the Joint Staff, would divert the Chairman from concentration on major resource issues and be both undesirable and probably unworkable. His focus should properly be on mission areas and readiness deficiencies. Increased Service and JCS input to the Chairman on broad issues of warfighting capability would be useful to strengthen the Chairman's position in relating the impact of resource allocation to the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs.

#### SECDEF AND OSD

- Issue 1: Specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided to JCS but without undue detail about how they are to be attained. (p. 47)

Comment: Concur. The provision of concise and clear policy guidance is absolutely necessary in order for military planners to design operational plans to support national objectives.

- Issue 2: SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning. (p. 47)

Comment: One of the most important functions of OSD is to provide broad policy guidance to military planners, so that operational plans will accomplish national security objectives. In this regard OSD provides a statement of what is desired and military planners then determine how to achieve the stated objectives. It should be most useful to receive policy guidance as it applies to the assumptions and objectives section of the plan to ensure that they reflect national objectives. Plan review might be simplified by means of JCS briefings for OSD officials involved in providing policy guidance. Military planning per se should properly remain with the JCS and military departments.

Issue 3: Role of Under Secretary for Policy should include:

- assuring national security policy and objectives are provided to and reflected in JCS/Joint Staff plans for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear wars.
- developing long range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA.
- assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the CG and other PPBS documents.
- coordinating DOD input to national intelligence matters.
- coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program by DOD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force planning, or resource allocation. (p. 47)

Comment: The roles specified above for the new Under Secretary (Policy) provide a welcome consolidation in OSD for central staffing of military issues. Nonetheless, some observations are necessary:

- review of operational plans to assure conformance with policy can be useful, provided that final approval is maintained at the SECDEF/UNSECDEF level.
- assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the CG should be very helpful in balancing the current systems analysis flavor.
- coordinating the DOD intelligence input must be very carefully managed so as not to replace intelligence judgments with policy statements.

- coordinating the annual study effort should be a welcome step in eliminating duplication of effort and could evenly distribute the study load among the agencies.

The concept of centralizing the policy point of contact in the USD(P) office is concurred in, but the JCS must remain responsible for military operational plans.

Issue 4: ASD(ISA), PA&E, Director Net Assessment, and DOD Intelligence elements should report to SECDEF through USD(Policy) who would have tasking and coordinating responsibility for these offices while they would retain responsibility and control over substantive judgments and evaluations of their offices. (p. 48)

Comment: The CNO supports the effort to assign to USD(P) tasking and coordinating responsibility for ASD(ISA), PA&E, and the Director Net Assessment. Provided that the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) can handle all the roles envisioned for him in the previous issue, along with the substantial tasking recommended in this issue, there is only one area of concern. The Director, DIA currently reports to the Chairman, JCS on matters concerning intelligence support to the JCS and the CINCs. This separation of policy and intelligence should be preserved.

#### THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE JOINT STAFF

Issue 1: JCS should revise procedures to:

- make joint staff alone responsible for authorship of JCS papers.
- present comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.
- provide initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate (p. 64).

Comment: In actual fact, all of the provisions recommended above are current procedure. The Joint Staff is responsible for authorship of papers (with Service coordination). Service Chiefs have the means to express differing views, and high level guidance has been instituted. Nonetheless, there is room for improvement in the quality and timeliness of military advice.

The Joint Staff is exploring ways to provide alternatives, to improve clarity and brevity without detracting from content, and to use high level guidance from the outset. The CNO supports Joint Staff efforts to streamline and improve staffing of joint papers.

Issue 2: SECDEF should reissue Gates memo with narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to CJCS (p. 65).

Comment: Familiarity with, and participation in, the Joint Staff process or joint staff billets is most useful for our Flag Officers. Accordingly, such experience should rightly be expected of a majority of those officers. Nonetheless, there are a significant number of Flag quality candidates whose technical speciality or career pattern prohibit such assignment.

Assignment to joint duty whenever possible is recommended, but the Gates memorandum must have sufficient latitude to permit Service exceptions.

Issue 3: Service Chiefs should commit their most outstanding and highly qualified officers to Joint Staff (p. 65).

Comment: CNO does not concur with this position. While the Navy has taken steps to upgrade the experience level of officers assigned to the Joint Staff, the demands of other agencies and staffs preclude assignment of all the top talent to the Joint Staff. However, the Navy will continue to provide a fair share of top performing officers to the Joint Staff.

Issue 4: SECDEF should empower CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by CJCS (p. 65).

Comment: The CNO does not concur. Such a policy, if effected on a large scale, would actually penalize the Chairman. He would be selecting from a small span of resources known to him, while BUPERS is able to nominate the best qualified officers from the total Navy assets. In addition, such arbitrary selection could very well be detrimental to the career needs of both the Service and the individual. The present system accommodates consideration of requests by higher authority while permitting alternative nominations of other quality candidates. Such a process ensures that Navy provides the highest possible quality to the Joint Staff.

The Navy should consider favorably any CJCS request for an officer but should retain the Service prerogative to determine the needs of the individual and the U.S. Navy.

Issue 5: That the Chairman, JCS be responsible for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues, and be given Joint Staff support to make broad program and budget judgements. (p. 69)

Comment: The Chairman can clearly play a useful role in advising on broad resource allocation issues, as they relate to required warfighting capabilities. He can perform this function with the existing resources of the Joint Staff augmented by Service inputs. There is evidence that the new JPAM will evolve into a useful management tool for providing the Chairman with program information on major issues, without the need to increase the number of personnel involved in staff support. It is both proper and useful for the Chairman to provide inputs on the macromanagement of defense resources. Any role which would involve him in detailed programming issues, or require an expansion of the Joint Staff, would be counterproductive to sound management, and divert the Chairman's time and attention away from other, more critical responsibilities.

Issue 6: That the Chairman be a voting member of the DSARC.  
(p. 69)

Comment: The Chairman is fully occupied with his many statutory responsibilities. To impose the additional responsibility of DSARC staffing and meetings is a significant addition to his workload. Moreover, it would seem inappropriate to insert the Chairman into the Service requirement problem at the Assistant SECDEF level. Since the DSARC does not make decisions, but simply recommends, the Chairman might better use his time to become familiar with major issues of Service interest.

Issue 7: In consultation with JCS and USD (Policy), manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. (p. 69)

Comment: Coordination of the annual study effort should be a welcome step to ensure elimination of duplication and to evenly distribute the joint study workload. The Services should continue to manage their own Service-related studies.

## NATIONAL MILITARY ADVISORS

Issue 1: If earlier recommendations oriented toward strengthening the Joint Staff and the role of the CJCS do not cure much of the dissatisfaction with joint formal advice, separation of the joint advice and command functions from those of Service administration would become necessary.

-- might be accomplished by establishment of NMA.  
(p. 70)

Comment: This is a drastic, controversial proposal which could not be accomplished in an evolutionary manner. Navy supports many of the recommendations of the Study which strengthen the role of the Chairman, JCS and which seek to streamline the joint process. The CNO believes that such measures are preferable to a body like the NMA, which would have authority but no responsibility.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
PL2-JTB-hws  
3 AUG 1978

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Request for Comments on Departmental Headquarters and National Military Command Structure Studies

Ref: (a) SecNav Memo of 14 July 1978; same subject

Encl: (1) Marine Corps Comments on Departmental Headquarters Study (IGNATIUS Study)  
(2) Marine Corps Comments on National Military Command Structure Study (STEADMAN Study)

1. The Marine Corps' response to reference (a) is contained in enclosures (1) and (2). Enclosure (1) contains comments on each of the thirteen recommendations listed in the Departmental Headquarters Study while enclosure (2) provides comments and the Marine Corps' position, with supporting rationale, relative to the National Military Command Structure Study.

2. The subject studies have highlighted important aspects of management techniques and functions, as well as the decision-making process, within the Department of Defense. These highlighted aspects are, for the most part, believed to be the result of the evolutionary developments of national security concerns.

a. The majority of the recommendations contained in each of the subject studies are viewed with favor. Those recommendations in enclosure (2) dealing with policy guidance, the role of the Under Secretary for Policy, and wartime/crisis management are believed to be particularly worthy of positive consideration. These recommendations can be enthusiastically endorsed and fully supported by the Marine Corps. Their early adoption should enhance both effectiveness and efficiency in performing the national security mission today and in the future.

b. Some of the recommendations cannot be fully supported as it is believed their adoption would not enhance total effectiveness. Those recommendations in enclosure (2) dealing with the assignment of officers to the Joint Staff are worthy of mention. The Marine Corps has, throughout its association with the JCS, assigned the best qualified officers to those duties associated with the Joint Staff. (As a




Subj: Request for Comments on Departmental Headquarters and National Military Command Structure Studies

matter of interest the Marine Corps assigns a higher percentage of its own headquarters officers to matters dealing with JCS than any other Service.) The Service Chiefs are in the best position to determine who their most qualified officers are for Joint Staff duty and it is believed they should retain assignment authority.

c. It is further believed prudent to withhold detailed comment and further action on those recommendations concerned with resource allocation measures until the separate Defense Resource Management Study is received and reviewed.

3. A resume of those STEADMAN Study recommendations considered most significant, with the Marine Corps' position and rationale, are provided separately at the tab to enclosure (2), for quick reference.



LOUIS H. WILSON  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

MARINE CORPS COMMENTS ON NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE  
STUDY (STEADMAN STUDY)

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN:

1. UCP should be reviewed at intervals not to exceed 2 years

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The UCP should be reviewed by the JCS as recommended. Based on this review the JCS can recommend necessary modifications to SecDef if required.

\* \* \*

2. CINC selection should be on the basis of best available qualified officer with consideration given to mission and forces assigned rather than to strictly Service missions.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The assignment of the best qualified officer is both necessary and in the interest of the Services, JCS and the NCA. Additionally, the CINC is expected to exhibit strategist's skills as well -- be able to blend US forces in joint operations and on occasion, allied forces, in combined operations, to ensure the most effective and efficient use of the forces made available to him.

\* \* \*

3. In considering UCP organization and functions, a CINC's "military-diplomacy" role should be an important consideration.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The unified CINC is the senior US military official responsible for a stated geographical portion of the world. As such, he is viewed by the military leadership of the countries within his area of responsibility as an authoritative spokesman for US politico-military policy. On visits to these countries, the CINC is expected to articulate facets of US politico-military policy as they impact on the country visited. The CINC should retain authority over security assistance matters for the countries within his area of responsibility so that he can continue to coordinate this as well as other aspects of the US politico-military effort for the area.

Enclosure (2)

4. There is no need for unified commands to cover all areas of the world.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The UCP, as presently structured, recognizes there is no need to assign geographical responsibility for all areas of the world. US security interests will dictate those areas where armed forces employment appears warranted, and hence must be incorporated in areas of responsibility under the planning and operational responsibility of a military unified command.

\* \* \*

5. The Middle East should remain a EUCOM area of responsibility.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The Unified Command Plan's recognition of the mutuality of NATO interest in the Middle East and the need for concerted, not conflicting allied policy, is compelling.

\* \* \*

6. EUCOM should continue to plan for, and execute when directed, all contingency operations in the Middle East.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The Middle East is within EUCOM's assigned geographical area. CINCEUR must, therefore, provide for the centralized direction of the forces within the area, integrate the efforts of the service components, fix responsibility for normal, continuing operations and effect essential coordination of logistic support. Inherent in this, CINCEUR must continue to plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate contingency operations in the Middle East.

\* \* \*

7. There should be sufficient flexibility in the Middle East planning to permit a contingency to be run directly from Washington, with EUCOM in a supporting role and/or to permit establishment of an on-scene Unified Command reporting either to EUCOM or direct to Washington.

- - Enclosure (2)

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: a. The study, in analyzing wartime/crisis management (pg 24-32), cautions against, and details the dangers of, by-passing the chain of command. The portion of this recommendation that calls for sufficient flexibility in planning to allow a contingency to be run directly from Washington is, therefore, taken to mean that the WWMCCS must provide the means of accomplishing this and the recommendation is not, in fact, advocating the chain of command be by-passed.

b. The concept of a subordinate unified commander for the Middle East, reporting directly to EUCOM, should be evaluated by the JCS.

\* \* \*

8. The JCS should examine the concept of a sub-unified command for the Middle East, reporting to EUCOM, and then provide their advice on the proposal to the Secretary of Defense.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: An examination of the concept of a subordinate unified command in the Middle East, reporting to EUCOM should be undertaken by the JCS as a matter of priority.

\* \* \*

9. Africa south of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUCOM.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: The study concludes that assignment of Africa south of the Sahara to EUCOM at this time "would send signals and perhaps create expectations of involvement beyond the present intent of policymakers". The OJCS is presently preparing a report for the JCS on this subject. Completion of this action will result in a report being submitted to the SecDef.

10. LANTCOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The assigned area and responsibilities, as reflected in the unified command plan, are proper.

\* \* \*

11. The JCS should review the command arrangements for US maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and determine whether these achieve optimum effectiveness for US and NATO defense postures.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: An examination of the command arrangements for US maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean should determine how optimum effectiveness can be achieved. The concepts to be examined include various implications that impact upon force structure, Soviet and Allied perceptions and the flexibility of US naval assets, not only in the Mediterranean/Atlantic but also upon worldwide naval deployments.

\* \* \*

12. PACOM should retain its presently assigned areas and responsibilities.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The presently assigned general area of responsibility and the existing command arrangements in PACOM provide for the optimum effectiveness of US military forces required to support and advance national policies.

Enclosure (2)

13. Planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis/wartime command arrangements for US Forces, Korea should retain maximum flexibility to permit alternative arrangements to include the present command organization, direct command by Washington of US Forces, Korea or a combination of the two. Where organizational decisions cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, they should be made in favor of an assumption that there will be a unified command reporting directly to Washington.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: There is no evidence that indicates PACOM cannot continue to effectively manage and control operations in Korea under the present command arrangement. At a time when US Forces are being reduced in Korea, the establishment of an additional unified command would be counterproductive. Effective means presently exist for Washington to provide guidance with CINCPAC in a supporting role.

\* \* \*

14. The Army Component Command should not be reinstated unless a convincing argument is made that this would be demonstrably more effective than present arrangements.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The present arrangement appears to be satisfactory and effective.

\* \* \*

15. REDCOM should be designated as the focal point for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly as they pertain to lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: The UCP charges USCINCRD with "deployment planning for assigned or programmed forces to reinforce the other unified and specified commands". REDCOM has developed a Deployment Management System (DEPMAS) to manage and monitor multiple mode transportation activities during large scale deployments. REDCOM has proposed that the JCS evaluate the overall DEPMAS concept as a possible adjunct to the crisis action system. Until such is accomplished it would be premature to comment on this recommendation.

Enclosure (2)

16. REDCOM should have greater Naval and Marine forces participation in its joint training exercises.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: Fleet Marine forces are assigned to unified commands other than REDCOM and their requirements for training and operations must, of necessity, take precedence. The Marine Corps has participated in REDCOM sponsored joint training exercises at the combined arms level (BLT/MAGTF) on a limited basis due to asset and funding constraints. Nevertheless, and with full regard to these constraints, the Marine Corps will study ways in which participation in future joint training exercises may be increased.

\* \* \*

17. REDCOM should be given a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: Primary responsibility for the development of doctrine and procedures for certain specific types of joint operations is assigned to individual Services by the Functions Paper (DOB Directive 5100.1) and JCS Pub 2. JCS Pub 2 states (paragraph 10110.b) that SecDef may, with the advice and recommendation of JCS, assign responsibility for the development of doctrine and procedures covering additional specific types of joint operations not otherwise assigned. A determination should be made as to what unassigned doctrine and procedures on joint operations should be assigned and what areas require the development of additional joint doctrine.

\* \* \*

18. Navy and Marine participation on the REDCOM staff would be increased to achieve these objectives.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: A position regarding increased levels of Marine Corps staffing will be dependent on the conclusions reached in the study of greater Marine force participation in REDCOM joint training exercises.

Enclosure (2)

19. Retain SOUTHCOM as presently constituted for at least the period of negotiation and transfer of responsibilities and facilities resulting from the Panama Canal treaties.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The logic developed in the report regarding the transition period, during which the Panama Canal responsibilities and facilities will be turned over, as well as the other important and pressing tasks being performed by SOUTHCOM, are compelling reasons for maintaining this unified command.

\* \* \*

20. When this transition period is over, review the future of SOUTHCOM in light of the then-prevailing military/political environment.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: SOUTHCOM's mission and responsibilities should be reviewed at the appropriate time.

.. Enclosure (2)



## WARTIME/CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. The chain of command to be used in any particular crisis should be clearly enunciated at the outset. If any element is to be by-passed, it should remain fully informed of developments. There should be no confusion as to the proper flow of communications and the focus of responsibility.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The decisive application of military force requires unity of command which is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority. This recommendation takes cognizance of this fact and is supportive of a clearly defined chain of command.

\* \* \*

2. NCA decisions during crises should be written and verified whenever possible. Even oral decisions required during emergencies should be followed up immediately in writing. In addition, feedback mechanisms should be established to insure that decisionmakers know the status of implementation.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: Direct, clear, concise written orders, acknowledged on receipt, reduce misunderstanding and confusion.

\* \* \*

3. A variety of NMCC-centered command post exercises responding to realistic hypothetical crises should be undertaken to test the ability of the NMCS to support the NCA. Senior level policymaking personnel should be encouraged to participate.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: A variety of such CPX Exercises are in fact conducted as directed by JCS MOP 177; JCS-sponsored Command Post Exercise Program. Analysis of the results of these exercises in turn cause required system modifications.

-Enclosure (2)

MANAGEMENT OF  
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

1. That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of the forces under his command.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: Current procedures presently provide for a participatory role for the CINCs. The CINCs input yearly to JSPD and JSCP, provide a quarterly report of major issues and activities directly to SecDef, and submit a semi-annual readiness/situation report to the JCS, who attach Service comments and forward it to SecDef. Expanded opportunities for participation, coupled with present procedures along with those prerogatives inherent in command, should provide a CINC with constant access to the JCS and the opportunity to participate in joint decision-making.

\* \* \*

2. That the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs and that to facilitate this, he amend present directives to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders to the CINCs through the Chairman who will act in consultation with the JCS when time permits. The JCS would remain as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: The JCS are the principal military advisers to the NCA and it is their duty to serve as advisers and as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to the CINCs. That chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the JCS to the CINCs. Orders to the CINCs may be issued by the JCS by the authority and direction of SecDef. This arrangement results from specific intent of Congress not to create a single Chief of Staff. To designate the CJCS as the agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs raises the potential for creating a defacto power structure consisting of the CJCS, the CINCs and a special Joint Staff selected by the Chairman. This structure, if institutionalized, could assume a special mantle of creditability and authority stemming from the alleged void of service bias that would impact adversely on the statutorily grounded authority and prerogatives of the secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs.

Enclosure (2)

3. That the Services/JCS/OSD conduct an in-depth review of readiness/capabilities reporting with a view toward developing a system which will provide the Secretary with detailed, thorough, and well articulated information on readiness and force capabilities including limitations, and recommendations for deficiency correction.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: There are ongoing JCS and DOD studies that are examining methods of defining and measuring total force readiness and total force capability as called for in this recommendation.

\* \* \*

4. That the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, be given a formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: No comment at this time.

Rationale: It would be premature to comment on this recommendation until the results of the Defense Resource Management Study (Rice Study), which is charged with determining what changes in DOD organization for resource management are required, are known.

Enclosure (2)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OSD

1. Specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided to the JCS but without undue detail about how they are to be attained.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The need for a clear statement of national objectives, derived military objectives, and the national strategy to accomplish/achieve the objectives is evident from the most recent draft CG. The military must be told what capabilities they must develop and what strategy they must be able to support if they are to be able to develop forces and concepts of force employment. The critical need is for mid-range guidance, so that objectives may be established for programs to build towards.

\* \* \*

2. The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: "Regularly" should be limited to initial plan development and occasions of substantive change. "Selected key assistants" should be extremely limited. Means of review should be a JCS briefing for the reviewers.

Enclosure (2)

3. The role of the Under Secretary for Policy should include:

a. Assuring that national security policy and objectives are provided for and reflected in JCS/JS plans for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear wars.

b. Developing long-range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA.

c. Assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other PPBS documents.

d. Coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by DOD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The Under Secretary for Policy can strive for a consonance and correlation of policy within DOD which will serve to enhance the formulation of national security policy.

\* \* \*

4. The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the Director for Net Assessment, and the DOD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and coordinating responsibility for these offices, while they would retain responsibility and control over the substantive judgments and evaluations of their offices.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The reorganization recommended would appear to provide for a unity of effort by adherence of all concerned to common objectives, plans, and administrative direction.

Enclosure (2)

1. The JCS should revise their procedures to:

- a. Make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of Joint papers.

MARINE CORPS POSITION. Non-concur.

Rationale: Papers now prepared by the CJCS for consideration by the JCS are forwarded to the Services for review, comment or coordination. This coordination provides for full development of papers allowing for a divergence of views to be expressed and accommodated. A proviso to charge the Joint Staff with sole authorship would narrow the scope of JCS papers by allowing development without benefit of full and responsible Service and DOD staffing and the checks and balance inherent in current procedures.

- b. Present comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: OJCS administrative procedures do provide the JCS the opportunity to fully examine divergent views developed in the preparation of a paper. The point to be made is that these procedures should be exercised more frequently in developing JCS positions.

- c. Provide initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: Guidance issued to the Joint Staff on selected topics and issues prior to the initiation of staff action would be a definitive aid in the development of a paper. The appropriateness of this guidance will depend upon the issue at hand and will not apply "across the board" to all issues. On those occasions, when guidance is required, it would appear prudent for the Joint Staff to brief the issue; stimulate discussion, and seek guidance at the OpDep/Chiefs level however, such occasions should be limited to those issues that lack definitive policy guidance or are time sensitive.

2. The Secretary of Defense should reissue the Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to the Chairman, JCS.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: DOD is presently revising DOD Directive 1320.5 with specific tasking given to define a less liberal definition of what constitutes joint duty and equivalent qualifying duty. As presently conceived, exceptions and waivers of the requirements for joint duty are approved by the Service Secretaries and forwarded to SecDef. Since existing procedures and the revision of DOD Directive 1320.5 should ensure the essential qualifications of prospective general/flag officers there is no requirement for SecDef to take the delegated authority away from the Service Secretaries and give it to CJCS.

\* \* \*

3. The Service Chiefs should commit their best outstanding and highly qualified officers for assignment to the Joint Staff.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Concur.

Rationale: The Marine Corps' continuing policy of directing assignment to the Joint Staff from among the best qualified Marine officers available has proven to be beneficial to the Joint Staff, the individual officer concerned and the Marine Corps. That policy will continue.

\* \* \*

4. The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff of any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: The assignment of an officer to Joint Staff duty should remain the prerogative of the Service Chiefs. The Marine Corps currently directs assignment to the Joint Staff from among the best qualified Marine officers available with due consideration for rotation requirements, officer's career development and DOD assignment policy constraints.

- Enclosure (2)

## INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CJCS

1. That the Secretary of Defense designate the Chairman, JCS as responsible for providing military advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget issues.

### MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: The intent of Congress was to ensure that when functioning as members of the JCS, the Service Chiefs would be fully informed of the day-to-day problems, activities and capabilities of their Services. The knowledge gained in this role produces the experience and expertise that is indispensable at the table of JCS. The report implies that the JCS are inoperative in the resource allocation arena because of proposing and supporting service interests in the POM and then being expected to denounce or modify this POM for reasons of fiscal constraints and competing budget allocation. Such is not the case as evidenced by the recent JPAM, a new JCS document, in which the JCS identified program priorities and alternatives to the NCA. The JPAM can be expected to evolve into a meaningful management tool that will provide appropriate and timely JCS advice.

\* \* \*

2. That the CJCS be established as a voting member of the DSARC.

### MARINE CORPS POSITION: Non-concur.

Rationale: CJCS involvement as a voting member of the DSARC would insert him into the arena of service requirements and organization at the ASD level. Integrated military positions are now made available to the DSARC via Decision Coordination Papers and CINC's can make their views known directly to SecDef. No major advantage is achieved by CJCS membership on the DSARC.

Enclosure (2)



3. That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. It should be designed to clarify or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: Requires further study.

Rationale: The creation of an annual study, analysis and gaming program will require detailed study to determine what benefits would accrue.

\* \* \*

4. That the Chairman be given appropriate Joint Staff support to make broad program and budget judgments.

MARINE CORPS POSITION: No comment at this time.

Rationale: It would be premature to comment on this recommendation until the results of the Defense Resource Management Study (RICE Study); which is charged with determining what changes in DOD organization for resource management are required, are known.

Enclosure (2)

## NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

### SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDATIONS, POSITION, RATIONALE

#### Unified Command Plan

##### Requires Further Study:

- 9 Africa South of the Sahara should not now be assigned to EUCOM.

Summary of Rationale: The assignment would allow the NCA an available range of military options which would be a reasoned and prudent approach to Africa South of the Sahara, an area of national interest.

- 15 REDCOM should be designated as the focal point for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of mobilization/ deployment planning of all CINCs, particularly as they pertain to lift requirements and detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.

Summary of Rationale: The UCP charges REDCOM with deployment planning responsibilities for assigned or programmed forces. REDCOM has developed a Deployment Management System (DEPMAS) to accomplish this. The JCS have not yet evaluated the system and its possible applications - further study is required.

#### Management of Unified and Specified Commands

##### Concur:

- 1 That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of the forces under his command.

Summary of Rationale: The opportunities allowing the CINCs access to the JCS and participation in Joint decision making should be expanded whenever possible.

##### Non-concur:

- 2 That the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs and that to facilitate this, he amend present directives to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders to the CINCs through the Chairman who will act in consultation with the JCS when time permits. The JCS would remain as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.

Summary of Rationale: The designation of CJCS as the agent for supervising the activities of the CINCS violates the intent of Congress not to create a single Chief of Staff. Although this is practiced today, to institutionalize this procedure would violate congressional intentions.

The Secretary of Defense and OSD

Concur:

- 1 Specific national security policy guidance, which sets objectives our forces should be capable of attaining, should be provided to the JCS but without detail about how they are to be attained.

Summary of Rationale: A need exists for a clear statement of national objectives, derived military objectives, and the National Strategy to accomplish the objectives.

- 2 The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review current military operational planning.

Summary of Rationale: Such review should take place at initial plan development and on occasions of substantial change. Review should be a JCS briefing limited to principals and "key assistants".

- 3 The role of the Under Secretary for Policy should include:

Assuring that national security policy and objectives are provided for and reflected in JCS/JS plans for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical and strategic nuclear wars.

Developing long-range national security policy plans for consideration by the NCA.

Assuring that national security objectives are reflected in the CG and other PPBS documents.

Coordinating DOD input to national intelligence matters.

Coordinating the annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by DOD and outside agencies to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, planning or resource allocation.

Summary of Rationale: These roles will provide for a consonance and correlation of policy within DOD.

- 4 The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the Director for Net Assessment, and the DOD intelligence elements should report to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and coordinating responsibility for these offices, while they would retain responsibility and control over the substantive judgements and evaluations of their offices.

Summary of Rationale: This organization would provide for unity of effort.

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff

Concur:

- 1 The JCS should revise the procedures to:
- a Present comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views.

Summary of Rationale: OJCS administrative procedures, which allow the opportunity to fully examine divergent views, should be exercised more frequently.

- c Provide initial high-level guidance to the Joint Staff when appropriate.

Summary of Rationale: The Joint Staff should brief selected issues and topics to the OpDep/Chief level to stimulate discussion and seek guidance.

Non-concur:

- 1 The JCS should revise their procedures to:

- a Make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of Joint papers.

Summary of Rationale: Charging the Joint Staff with sole authorship would narrow the scope of joint papers by allowing development without benefit of Service experience and the checks and balance inherent in current procedures.

- 2 The Secretary of Defense should reissue the Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint assignments and delegate authority to determine exceptions only to the Chairman, JCS.

Summary of Rationale: DOD is presently revising the directive to provide less liberal definitions. Service Secretaries should continue to recommend exemptions and waivers to SecDef.

- 4 The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain assignment to the Joint Staff of any requested officer, with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.

Summary of Rationale: The assignment should remain the prerogative of the Service Chief.

Increasing the Responsibilities of the CJCS

Requires Further Study:

- 3 That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the Services as appropriate. It should be designated to clarify or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.

Summary of Rationale: The need for such a program is not established. If it is established, it should be managed by the JCS and not the Chairman.